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This is a book review, written for the Journal of
Eaonomia Literature , of a recent symoosium volume
on a century of Swedish transformation.
<
A CENTURY OF SWEDISH TRANSFORMATION: A SYMPOSIUM
Bans Brems
Industvielt utveakling i Sverige. Teori oah
verklighet under ett sekel. (Industrial Development
in Sweden. A Century in Theory and Reality). By
Erik Dahm^n and Gunnar Eliasson (eds.). Stockholm:
Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1980. Pp. 407 .
ISBN 91-7204-119-6.
As stated in its opening paragraph, the purpose of
this stately volume is twofold: (1) to describe
and measure the transformation of the Swedish economy
over the past century, and (2) to interpret the find-
ings. Neither neoclassical economic theory whether
dealing with general, partial, or steady-state growth
equilibria nor modern macroeconomic theory was de-
signed for such interpretation. But Schumpeteri an
(1912) theory was designed for it.
Is there anything particularly Schumpeteri an
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about Sweden in the past century? Perhaps there is. •
First, in the first half of that century a small
number of large Swedish corporations were founded by
innovators so successful that Sweden itself was soon
too small for them. In 1974 the twenty largest Swe-
dish multinationals had 1/4 million employees inside
Sweden and another 1/4 million outside! Their
predominant industries are machinery, electric and-
electronic equipment, and their predominant hosts
are West Germany, France, and the United States
(SKF is larger than Timken). Swedish-owned subsidia-
ries abroad are worth three times as much as foreign
-owned subsidiaries in Sweden [Nils Lundgren (1979,
210-211, 239)]. The most comprehensive application
of Schumpeterian theory besides Schumpeter's own (1939)
was Erik Dahmen's (1950) analysis of Swedish entrepren-
eurship. . --
Second, Schumpeter (1942) believed that the
very efficiency of capitalism would make room for
the welfare state and, perhaps, for socialism. No-
where did Keynesian macroeconomi c theory appear as
early as in Sweden: Ohlin was a Keynesian three
years before Keynes himself [Srems (1978)]. Nowhere
under capitalism was the public sector to become as
massive as' in Sweden. But also: Nowhere under capi-
talism was the decline of industrial production after
the oil and food shocks of the mid-seventies as pro-
tracted as in Sweden: Large industrial economies as
a whole surpassed their 1974 level in 1977, Sweden
not until 1980.
The contributions by the two editors, both pre-
ceded by Schumpeter quotes, are long on methodology
and the history of economic thought. In addition, and
assisted by Anders Rydeman, Gunnar Eliasson offers four
very readable Swedish case histories, i. e.. Atlas
Copco, L. M. Ericsson, Sandvik, and Mo och Domsjo. All
four firms owed their success to consistent innovation.
More generally, structural transformation is exam-
ined by Martha Josefsson and Johan Drtengren judged
by the rich photography, the latter bears an even
physical resemblance to the Schumpeter of circa 1912. The
idea 1s that in a market economy, transformation
pressure manifests itself in the form of price sig-
nals: Whether originating on the demand side or on
the supply side and whether upward or downward, a
changing relative price of the product of an indu-
stry signals the need for transformation of that
industry. Disaggregating Swedish manufacturing
industry into 42 individual industries, Josefsson
and Drtengren measure the economy-wide transforma-
tion pressure from time x to time t as the weighted
sum of the numerical relative price changes of n
individual industries. The relative changes should,
and do, enter with their numerical value, because up-
ward and downward changes alike signal a transformation
pressure. The measure, whose dimension is per cent
per annum, is
n
l/(t - t) E a.{r)
PAt)/PAr)
P(t)/P(T)
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where P. = price of ith industry, P = price of all manu-
facturing, and a. = ith industry's share of the
value of all manufacturing. So the economy-wide
transformation pressure is high when relative price
changes are diverse among industries and low when
they are not. Josefsson and Drtengren found excep-
tionally high transformation pressures for the first
halves of the twenties, forties, fifties, and seven-
ties.
Did industry heed the signals? Josefsson and
Drtengren measure the economy-wide transformation
response from time t to time t as the weighted sum
of the numerical relative physical-output changes of n
Individual industries. The relative changes should,
and do, enter with their numerical value, because up-
ward and downward changes alike indicate a transformation
response. The measure, again in per cent per annum, is
l/(t
n
t) I a.{r)
i = l
" Q{t)/Q{r)
where Q = physical output. In other words, the
economy-wide transformation response is high when
relative physical -output changes are diverse among
industries and low when they are not. The excep-
tionally high transformation pressures found for
the first halves of the twenties, forties, and
fifties were found to be duly accompanied by high
transformation responses. But the signals of the
seventies went unheeded: There was high transfor-
mation pressure but no unusual transformation re-
sponse.
In 42 impressive diagrams, Josefsson and
Drtengren trace relative price, absolute physical
output, and share of industry for the 42 industries
1913-1977. Each decade's losers and winners are'
recorded. The overall losers were saw mills, tex-
tiles, and mining. The overall winners were the
electrical industry, machinery, chemicals, and
transportation equipment.
The fifties and sixties were the heyday of what
has been called the Swedish model of transformation.
The Swedish model was a successful piece of teamwork
by industry, labor, and government, and Ulf Jakobsson
and Lars Wohlin illustrate its workings by a vintage
model of growth. Industry responded to a rapidly
rising real wage rate by looking for and designing
ever better new vintages and by retiring old ones
ever earlier. Elsewhere in the volume Ragnar Bentzel
shows that in 1960-1965 and 1965-1970 the labor
productivity of manufacturing ind.ustrv was growing
by 6.2 and 6.0 per cent per annum, respectively, and
that the capital intensity of manufacturing industry
was growing by 7.6 and 5.1 per cent per annum, respect-
ively! Unions cooperated by favoring new technology,
by refusing to accept wage differentials among firms
or among industries, and by keeping up the wage press-
ure. The government cooperated in two ways. First
by adopting a labor market policy giving greater em-
phasis on geographical mobility than did any other
country, thus helping to resettle labor released
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from old vintages, old plants, and old industries.
Second, the government cooperated by expanding the
public sector more than did any other country, thus
helping to absorb labor released from old vintages,
old plant, and old industries but not needed in new
ones. The public sector expanded in the form of larger
transfer payments, better health care, and better educa-
tion but, for forty-odd years of labor government, never
in the form of nationalization of industry.
All good things come to an end, and so did the
Swedish model. The relatively ever larger public sector
superimposed on a relatively ever smaller manufacturing
base made the Swedish economy vulnerable to the oil and
food shocks. This time the transformation signals went un-
heeded, and the nonlabor coalition government coming
to power in 1976 tried to save jobs by nationalization
and Chrysl er- type bail-out schemes.
Defying the Schumpeterians , Ragnar Bentzel simulates
Swedish growth 1870-1975 by a putty-clay model whose only
disaggregation is the disaggregation of capital stock in-
(
to vintages. Such disaggregation is important to Bentzel ,
but not because old vintages would have to be retired be-
fore new technology can be adopted: Technological pro-
gress is disembodied and labor-augmenting. Rather, dis-
aggregation is important to him, because in a putty-clay
model old vintages must be retired before capi tal -1 abor
substitution can occur. Bentzel finds his capi tal -output
ratio to have remained the same for as long as the rate
of interest remained the same, i. e., 1870-1930, 1935-1950,
and 1955-1970. The capi tal -output ratio jumped three
times in response to a lower rate of interest, i. e.,
.1930-1935, 1950-1955, and 1970-75. As a result, maintain-
ing the high rates of growth of output of the fifties and
sixties would now require a much higher investment fraction
of output. For that and other reasons Bentzel agrees with
Abramovitz (1977) that it was the fifties and the sixties
rather than the seventies that were exceptional, Bentzel 's
emphasis on the rate of interest as a determinant of the
capi tal -output ratio enhances the significance of another
contribution to the symposium, i. e., Ingemar StShl's
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measurement of the Swedish nominal rate of interest,
rate of inflation, and real rate of Interest.
The symposium lives up to its subtitle "A Century
in Theory and Reality". The occasion was the eightieth
birthday of Marcus Wallenberg, Sweden's most prominent
living innovator and for 25 years chairman of the board
of Sweden's counterpart to our National Bureau, Industviens
Utredningsinstitut. All participants were past or pre-
sent members of the staff of that institute.
HANS BREMS
University of Illinois
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